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The Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or the Commission)
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have increasingly come to rely on parallel
civil and criminal proceedings, which involve concurrent investigations of the
same conduct by different government agencies, as an efficient means of law
enforcement.' The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which explicitly permit the Commission to share any information it
obtains through investigation and civil discovery with DOJ, make it possible
for DOJ and the SEC to coordinate their efforts when they investigate the same
conduct. 2 Because the SEC may avail itself of civil discovery tools,3 parallel
proceedings enable federal prosecutors to acquire evidence they might not be
able to obtain through criminal investigation and discovery under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 The SEC's civil enforcement also benefits from
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1. JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1008-20 (2001); Joseph F. Savage &
Robert J. Durbin, Government Use of Civil and Criminal Proceedings: Any Limits?, ANDREWS LITIG.
REP. (WHITE COLLAR CRIME), Dec. 2005, at 3; see also Anish Vashista et al., Securities Fraud, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 877, 934 (2005).
2. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000) (providing that whenever it appears to
the Commission that a violation of that Act has occurred, the Commission may "transmit such evidence
as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General who may, in his
discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this subchapter" (emphasis added));
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2000) (same). See generally 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77g-77bbb, 78a-78mm.
3. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b); see also Consol. Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1938) (holding
that SEC investigations under 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) are analogous to those of a grand jury, meaning that the
scope of inquiry need not be limited by questions of propriety, forecasts of the probable result of an
investigation, or by doubts about whether a particular individual will ultimately be subjected to formal
criminal accusation).
4. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Georgia A. Stanton & Renee Scatena, Parallel Proceedings-A
Discovery Minefield, 34 ARIZ. ATT'Y 17, 17-20 (1998); see also O'SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 1008-10;
Mark D. Hunter, SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings: Contemplating the Propriety of Recent Judicial
Trends, 68 MO. L. REV. 149, 164-65 (2003).
Yale Law & Policy Review
parallel proceedings. Business organizations and individuals often cooperate
with the SEC in order to avoid harsh civil penalties and/or referral to DOJ for
criminal prosecution.
However, parallel proceedings are in tension with an individual's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 5 Should the recipient of an SEC
subpoena invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the
SEC may view the invocation as evidence of guilt.6 The SEC may dole out civil
penalties such as career-ending license revocation or crippling fines. 7 Because
federal law permits the Commission to transmit any information it obtains in
the course of a civil investigation to the Attorney General, the civil defendant
must also be aware that a failure to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege may
provide DOJ with critical evidence for a criminal prosecution.8 Nevertheless,
courts have generally approved of parallel proceedings except in cases in which
the defendant could show that the government engaged in civil discovery in bad
faith.9
Two recent federal district court decisions, United States v. Stringer10 and
United States v. Scrushy,11 concluded that in some cases agencies have an
obligation to inform civil enforcement targets that DOJ will likely prosecute
them. In each case, the courts suppressed SEC civil depositions that the
Commission turned over to DOJ for use in a criminal prosecution. 12 The courts
found that DOJ had worked too closely with the SEC without informing
witnesses in the civil proceedings that DOJ intended to pursue criminal
prosecution. In each case, the court concluded that SEC/DOJ cooperation
amounted to a single investigation designed, in bad faith, to avail DOJ of civil
discovery and to prevent defendants from invoking their Fifth Amendment
rights against self-incrimination. 13 The government did not appeal the decision
in Scrushy, but has appealed the Stringer decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 14
This Comment recommends that courts decline to adopt the holdings in
5. Hunter, supra note 4, at 162-63; see United States v. Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929, 933-34 (D. Colo.
1963).
6. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Note, Using Equitable Powers To Coordinate
Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1023, 1026-30 (1985).
7. See. e.g., 3-56 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 56.06 (2006).
8. See Anthony A. Joseph & R. Marcus Givhan, The New Litigative Environment: Defending a
Client in Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, ALA. LAW., Jan. 1999, at 48.
9. See, e.g., O'SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 1008-10; Abbe David Lowell & Kathryn C. Arnold,
Corporate Crime after 2000: A New Law Enforcement Challenge or Dijd Vu?, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
219, 238 (2003) ("By now the law is fairly settled that any agency may proceed with its portion of the
parallel proceeding as long as it has the authority to act and has not overreached in its specific action.").
10. 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Or. 2006).
11. 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
12. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1090; Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
13. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1089-90; Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
14. Stringer, appeal docketed, No. 06-30100 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2006).
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Stringer and Scrushy. It argues that those decisions articulated a standard for
identifying bad faith in SEC discovery that too closely scrutinized interagency
communication and was not in accord with established case law. This
Comment concludes that extensive interagency communication did not, based
on the facts presented in both cases, require the SEC or DOJ to inform a
witness in a civil investigation that DOJ will likely prosecute him. Finally, this
Comment asserts that the SEC's standard procedures, which were followed in
Stringer and Scrushy, adequately protect witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination and further the public's interest in effective law
enforcement. When the SEC has informed an individual of his constitutional
rights, a warning that the Commission routinely passes information along to
DOJ should be sufficient notice of the possibility of criminal prosecution.'
5
I. COURTS HAVE GENERALLY APPROVED OF SEC/DOJ PARALLEL
PROCEEDINGS
As a general rule, whenever the SEC is considering civil enforcement in a
particular matter, it may seek discovery and share evidence with DOJ-even if
DOJ is contemplating criminal prosecution. 16 Courts agree that DOJ may "use
evidence acquired in a civil action in a subsequent criminal proceeding unless
the defendant demonstrates that such use would violate his constitutional rights
or depart from the proper administration of criminal justice."'17 However, the
agencies may not proceed with civil discovery in bad faith. Specifically, courts
have held that SEC and DOJ agents may not make false statements or
affirmatively deceive witnesses in a civil investigation, 18 fail to inform a
witness of his constitutional rights, 19 or conduct civil discovery for the purpose
of furthering a criminal proceeding. Otherwise, courts have generally
declined to prevent DOJ from using evidence obtained from the SEC through
the civil discovery process.
2 1
In United States v. Kordel, the Supreme Court's seminal treatment of
15. See United States v. Parrott (Parrott 11), 315 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af'd, 425
F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
16. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824 n.127 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
17. United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 101 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996).
18. See United States v. Rand, 308 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (finding a Fifth
Amendment violation when SEC officials led a witness to believe that he had been granted immunity
from criminal prosecution); see also United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Parrott (Parrott 1), 248 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D.D.C. 1965) ("The
defendants in the instant case ... produced records and gave testimony in proceedings at which they
were often without counsel and often not warned of their constitutional rights.").
20. See Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (holding that a
civil enforcement proceeding may not serve as a "mere conduit" for a criminal prosecution).
2 1. Hunter, supra note 4, at 151-57; Savage & Durbin, supra note 1, at 3-4. Courts may-but rarely
do-stay civil proceedings. E.g., Kashi v. Grastos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986).
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parallel proceedings, the Court held that a criminal defendant's responses to
FDA interrogatories (in which he divulged incriminating information)
amounted to a waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 22 A unanimous Court23 rejected the argument that courts should
force the government to decide whether to pursue or forego criminal
prosecution before beginning a civil proceeding: "It would stultify enforcement
of federal law to require a governmental agency ... invariably to choose either
to forgo recommendation of a criminal prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or
to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a trial."24
The Kordel Court also affirmed that due process does not require DOJ or a
government agency to inform a witness in a civil investigation that DOJ will
likely prosecute him. While the court acknowledged in dicta that it did not
address a situation in which the government failed to inform a defendant in a
civil enforcement proceeding that his case would be referred to DOJ for
criminal prosecution, the Court recognized that the individual defendant must
make his own choice as to when to assert his constitutional rights: "Without
question [the defendant] could have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. Surely [the defendant] was not barred
from asserting his privilege simply because ... the proceeding in which the
Government sought information was civil rather than criminal in nature.,
25
The D.C. Circuit followed Kordel's lead in SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,
when it concluded that it would not block SEC/DOJ parallel investigations
unless agency cooperation "demonstrably prejudice[d] substantial rights of the
investigated party., 26 In Dresser Industries, a defendant in an SEC enforcement
proceeding had argued that enforcement of an SEC subpoena against him
would unfairly expand DOJ's discovery in the event that the Department chose
to prosecute. 27 The court replied with the observation that "effective
enforcement of the securities laws requires that the SEC and DOJ be able to
investigate possible violations simultaneously."
28
In dicta, the Kordel Court left open the possibility that under "special
circumstances," such as a civil action undertaken "solely" to obtain evidence
for criminal prosecution, courts might either stay civil proceedings pending the
completion of criminal trial or disallow the use of evidence obtained in civil
29proceedings. However, the Court did not define bad faith discovery in the
22. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).
23. Justice Black took no part in the opinion. Id. at 1.
24. Id. at 11.
25. Id. at 7-8.
26. 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
27. Id. The defendant had not been indicted or informed that the government would seek indictment
at the time he made his motion to quash the SEC subpoena. Id.
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12 ("We do not deal here with a case where the Government has brought a
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context of parallel proceedings, and it did not establish a doctrinal test or
describe a specific set of circumstances under which a parallel criminal
proceeding could not gather evidence from an agency civil proceeding.
Moreover, the Court's holding did not indicate that any particular amount of
interagency communication and/or cooperation would require that the agencies
inform witnesses of likely prosecution. The final paragraph of its opinion
merely observed that the facts presented did not suggest that the agencies'
cooperation in that case was unconstitutional or improper.
30
Nevertheless, Kordel's suggestion that the government could not exploit
civil discovery "solely" for the purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal
prosecution ran contrary to the holding in United States v. Parrott (Parrott 1),
an opinion from a federal district court in the District. of Columbia.3 1 Noting
that witnesses subpoenaed in civil proceedings often must choose between
"harmful disclosure, contempt, [and] perjury," the Parrott I court had endorsed
the proposition that "parallel civil and criminal inquiries should not be
commingled. 32 The court's broad conclusion that the government could not
"bring a parallel civil proceeding and avail itself of civil discovery devices to
obtain evidence for subsequent criminal prosecution" 33 had been embraced by
some courts, including the court that Kordel reversed, to support the argument
that the government's failure to apprise a defendant of a contemplated criminal
proceeding could be impermissible-even when the government was also
pursuing civil enforcement.
34
One year before Kordel, a federal district court in the Southern District of
New York considered essentially the same facts as those in Parrott I and
concluded, in direct contradiction of Parrott I, that the government had no
obligation to inform potential criminal defendants of possible indictment.35 In
that case, which was also styled United States v. Parrott (Parrott H1),
defendants who had been convicted of criminal securities violations sought
reversal on the grounds that the government's civil proceeding had aided the
civil action solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution or has failed to advise the defendant in
its civil proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution; nor with a case where the defendant is
without counsel or reasonably fears prejudice from adverse pretrial publicity or other unfair injury; nor
with any other circumstances that might suggest the unconstitutionality or even the impropriety of this
criminal prosecution." (citations omitted)).
30. Id.
31. Parrottl, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965).
32. Id. at 201-02.
33. Id. at 202.
34. United States v. Detroit Vital Foods, 407 F.2d 575-76 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Rand, 308 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (N.D. Ohio 1970)
(citing the govemment's brief in Detroit Vital Foods). But see Parrott II, 315 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), aff-d, 425 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970) (holding, under essentially
identical facts, that DOJ's and the SEC's actions were permissible).
35. Parrott 1, 315 F. Supp. at 1015.
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parallel criminal proceeding in violation of their constitutional rights.36 The
court held that the SEC's civil action was itself "ample notice" that the
defendants' conduct could be subject to criminal prosecution, a possibility that
the SEC had emphasized by warning them against self-incrimination
throughout the civil proceedings. 37 The court further held that once the
government had warned defendants of their rights against self-incrimination it
had "no duty... to warn" the defendants at any point during the SEC
proceeding that they might be indicted.38
II. STRINGER & SCRUSHY ARTICULATED A NEW STANDARD
Courts have yet to develop a clear standard that describes bad faith civil
discovery in parallel proceedings. 39 Nevertheless, SEC policy mandates that
targets of civil enforcement proceedings be made aware of the possibility of
criminal prosecution based on information obtained by the SEC from their
testimony. 40 SEC Form 1662 informs each witness that he has a right to counsel
and that he may at any time invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.4 The form also reminds each witness that the Commission
routinely makes files available to other government agencies, in particular
DOJ.
42
The Stringer court concluded that, in light of extensive cooperation
between the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) and the SEC, the SEC's standard
warning to deponents that statements may be referred to DOJ was insufficient
to protect the defendants' due process rights.43 In that case, prosecutors asked
SEC officials not to reveal DOJ's interest in the case to defendants in an SEC
enforcement proceeding. 44 At the defendants' depositions, SEC officials
informed them, per Form 1662, of their right against self-incrimination.




39. See United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (noting that the
court could find "no controlling authority" to distinguish a proper parallel investigation from an
improper one).
40. See United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affid, 101 F.3d 681 (2d Cir.
1996).
41. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC 1662, Supplemental Information for Persons Requested To Supply
Information Voluntarily or Directed To Supply Information Pursuant to a Commission Subpoena (Apr.
2004), http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/secl662.pdf. In a civil proceeding, the trier of fact may draw an
adverse inference from silence. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 1995).
42. See United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086-87 (D. Or. 2006).
43. Id. at 1090. The court noted that Form 1662 reminds defendants of their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 1086-87. Nevertheless, it concluded that "[iun light of the
active role of the USAO in the SEC investigation, this warning was insufficient." Id. at 1088.
44. See id. at 1086-88.
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likely prosecute.4 5 The court concluded that the two agencies were not
conducting "parallel" investigations but rather a single investigation designed
to prevent the defendants from invoking their constitutional rights.46 The court
held that it would have been "unrealistic to suppose that [the defendants would]
be on guard against incriminating [themselves]. 'A7
Similarly, though the Scrushy court admitted that it could find no
"controlling authority" to distinguish "a legitimate parallel investigation from
an improper one," it concluded that the SEC's standard form of notice had, in
light of extensive interagency cooperation, departed from the proper
48administration of justice. Noting that the USAO admitted that it had engaged
in extensive cooperation with SEC officials without informing defendant
Richard Scrushy of its intention to prosecute,49 the court concluded that the
government had, in bad faith, conducted "a de facto criminal investigation
using nominally civil means., 50 The government officials had made no false or
misleading statements to Scrushy or to his attorney. However, the court
announced that it could not "take such a limited view of bad faith."5 1
The Stringer and Scrushy courts concluded that extensive DOJ/SEC
cooperation triggered a government obligation to inform witnesses that they
would likely be prosecuted. The Stringer court, which faulted the SEC for
failing to inform civil deponents that a criminal prosecution "would most likely
occur," established a rule that, under those circumstances, the SEC was
responsible for conveying the likelihood of prosecution to the potential criminal
defendants. 52 The Scrushy court relied on a similar principle in holding that the
government had acted in bad faith. It noted that "[w]hen a defendant knows...
that a criminal investigation has targeted him, he can take actions to prevent the
providing of information in an administrative or civil proceeding that could
45. As a matter of policy, SEC officials decline to answer questions about the status of parallel
criminal investigations, but instead refer witnesses to the relevant USAO. Id. at 1086.
46. Id. at 1088.
47. Id. at 1089. In the eyes of the court the government's conduct constituted a due process
violation that infringed upon the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination. The court
concluded that the USAO's behavior was "so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the
universal sense of justice." Id. at 1089 (quoting United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir.
1991)).
48. United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ala. 2005). See generally Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (holding that courts have administrative authority over investigative
agencies).
49. Unbeknownst to Scrushy and his counsel, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of
Alabama had convinced SEC officials to depose the defendant in Birmingham, a request that coincided
with the expressed preference of the Scrushy defense team that he be deposed in Alabama, his home
state. The U.S. Attorney also communicated with SEC officials to ensure that certain topics would not
be addressed in the deposition. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
50. Id. at 1140.
51. Id.
52. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
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later be used against him in a criminal case." 53 Because the USAO and the SEC
knew that criminal prosecution was likely, the court concluded, one of the
agencies should have informed witnesses accordingly.
III. COURTS SHOULD DECLINE To ADOPT THE RULES IN STRINGER AND
SCRUSHY
Stringer and Scrushy addressed a tension between federal law enforcement
policy and the Fifth Amendment right of a witness to avoid self-incrimination
at a time when the government increasingly relies on interagency cooperation.
54
In July of 2002, responding to corporate scandals and decreased investor
confidence, President Bush ordered the formation of a Corporate Fraud Task
Force within DOJ. The Executive Order directed the Attorney General to
coordinate DOJ's criminal prosecutions with the actions of other government
agencies with civil enforcement powers. 55 Also, at a time when many USAOs
and SEC offices faced hiring freezes and budget cuts, parallel proceedings have
become a way for both agencies to conserve limited resources while conducting
complicated, labor-intensive investigations.
56
However, Stringer and Scrushy need not represent the final word on the
subject. Under the pre-Stringer/Scrushy case law there were three sets of
circumstances in which courts deemed DOJ/SEC parallel proceedings
improper. In the first, courts suppressed evidence obtained from a criminal
defendant who was not informed of certain constitutional rights, such as the
right against compulsory self-incrimination and the right to counsel.5 7 Second,
courts did not permit either agency to obtain evidence by making false
statements to a witness. 58 Finally, courts have held that the SEC acted in bad
faith when it conducted civil discovery solely as a tool to expand DOJ's access
to incriminating evidence against a particular defendant.59 However, when the
SEC could show that it might pursue civil enforcement, the Commission's
discovery process had never been halted merely because DOJ would likely
prosecute. In neither Stringer nor Scrushy did any of these three previously
53. Id. at 1139.
54. Savage & Durbin, supra note 1, at 3.
55. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003), reprinted as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (Supp.
II 2004).
56. A memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to all federal government attorneys in 1997
set into motion a trend of increased SEC/DOJ cooperation. Savage & Durbin, supra note 1, at 3. The
memorandum called for "greater cooperation, communication and teamwork between the criminal and
civil prosecutors." Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen., to United States Attorneys et al. (July 28,
1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading-room/usam/title l/dojOO027.htm.
57. See Parrott 1, 248 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D.D.C. 1965).
58. See United States v. Rand, 308 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
59. See Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1982); see also Rand,
308 F. Supp. at 1234 (noting that much of the evidence the SEC gathered was relevant to the criminal
proceeding but not the civil proceeding).
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identified circumstances obtain.
There is nothing in existing case law that would require the Ninth Circuit or
courts in other circuits to suppress evidence obtained in a DOJ/SEC parallel
proceeding solely on the basis of extensive interagency cooperation that was
not revealed to the civil defendant. In fact, the author's research uncovered no
decision since Kordel in which a court invalidated SEC/DOJ parallel
proceedings without citation to at least one of the three above-mentioned sets of
circumstances. Because widespread judicial application of the holdings in
Stringer and Scrushy would frustrate interagency cooperation, invade
prosecutorial discretion, and might, as the Kordel Court feared, "stultify
enforcement of federal laws," 60 the Ninth Circuit should either reverse Stringer
or limit the holding to its facts. An approach consistent with the holdings in
Kordel and Parrott II is supported by statute and furthers the public's interest
in enforcing federal law.
Stringer's and Scrushy's reliance on Parrott I created a standard for bad
faith in civil discovery that was less deferential to the government than the
standard that the Supreme Court articulated in Kordel. Stringer and Scrushy
each quoted Parrott I for the proposition that "the Government may not bring a
parallel civil proceeding and avail itself of civil discovery devices to obtain
evidence for subsequent criminal prosecution." 6 1 The Kordel dicta, handed
down five years after Parrott I, suggested that a government agency could not
bring a civil proceeding "solely to obtain" evidence for a criminal proceeding.
62
Neither Stringer nor Scrushy concluded that the SEC had no intention of
pursuing civil enforcement. Instead, each understood the Parrott I citation to
mean that when DOJ intends to prosecute, it cannot cooperate too closely with
the SEC-even when it is undisputed that the SEC intends to pursue civil
enforcement.
The holdings in Stringer and Scrushy also blurred an important distinction
in the case law between the government's false statements to defendants and
the government's failure to inform a civil defendant of probable prosecution.
Though Scrushy and Stringer held that the government had deceived civil
defendants merely by failing to inform them of possible criminal prosecution,
neither court cited a case in which the government's failure to inform (as
opposed to making a false statement) was the sole basis for deeming a parallel
proceeding improper. In the decisions that formed the bases for the holdings in
60. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 (1970) ("it would stultify enforcement of federal law to
require a governmental agency ... invariably to choose either to forgo recommendation of a criminal
prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a
trial.").
61. United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137-38 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (emphasis added)
(quoting Parrott 1, 248 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.D.C. 1965)); see also United States v. Stringer, 408 F.
Supp. 2d 1083, 1089 (D. Or. 2006) (quoting Parrott 1, 248 F. Supp. at 202).
62. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added).
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Stringer and Scrushy, the courts dismissed criminal indictments after finding
that the government had affirmatively misled defendants during civil
proceedings. 63 Even in Parrott I, the court noted that an SEC official had
falsely informed defendants that DOJ had not initiated criminal proceedings.
64
A judicial approach to parallel proceedings that scrutinized the timing of
DOJ's decision to prosecute would complicate interagency coordination and
invade prosecutorial discretion. If consistently applied by district courts, the
holdings in Stringer and Scrushy would in some cases place a burden on DOJ
to communicate its intentions with respect to prosecution to the SEC so that the
SEC could inform witnesses in civil investigations accordingly. Thus, in some
investigations, prosecutors would be forced to make hurried determinations
about criminal prosecution. Alternatively, DOJ might have to choose early in
an SEC investigation to forgo criminal prosecution so as to avoid the
appearance of having availed itself of civil discovery.
65
Current SEC policy sufficiently protects the constitutional rights of those
involved in civil enforcement proceedings. 66 The Commission routinely
informs witnesses submitting evidence in civil proceedings of their Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and of their right to
67counsel. The SEC also reminds witnesses that any evidence the SEC obtains
from them may be submitted to DOJ. Consistent with the rule in Kordel and the
holding in Parrott II, the SEC's regulations inform defendants of their rights
68and require defendants to decide for themselves how to proceed. Moreover, as
at least one court has pointed out, parallel proceedings dovetail with a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.6 9
Departing from recent precedent, the holdings in Scrushy and Stringer
encroached upon the authority of duly enacted federal laws and the policy
choices of elected officials by limiting the circumstances under which the SEC
63. In Rand, the court concluded that an SEC official had promised the defendant immunity from
criminal prosecution in exchange for testimony at a civil enforcement hearing. 308 F. Supp. at 1236. In
Parrott I, which constituted a foundation of the Scrushy court's reasoning, SEC officials told a
defendant who was about to provide testimony in an administrative hearing that DOJ had not initiated
criminal proceedings. 248 F. Supp. at 199 ("The SEC attorney denied that criminal proceedings had
been instituted against any of the persons involved."). SEC officials in Parrott I also failed to inform
witnesses of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
64. Parrott 1, 248 F. Supp. at 201.
65. See United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[I]t is unrealistic to suggest
that the government could or should keep a taxpayer advised as to the direction in which its necessarily
fluctuating investigations lead. The burden on the government would be impossible to discharge in fact,
and would serve no useful purpose.").
66. See Parrott I, 315 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
67. See United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086-87 (D. Or. 2006); United States v.
Teyibo, 877 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 101 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996).
68. See Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 1086-88.
69. United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
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may share information with DOJ. At a time when resources are scarce for
both agencies, parallel proceedings ensure that more violations of securities
laws will be given the attention they merit. Some courts have recognized
parallel proceedings as an important and democratically chosen means of law
enforcement. For example, in United States v. Fields, the Second Circuit took
note of Congress's approval of DOJ/SEC parallel proceedings. The court cited
a House committee report that stated: "Traditionally, there has been a close
working relationship between the Justice Department and the SEC. The
Committee [on Interstate and Foreign Commerce] fully expects that this
cooperation between the two agencies will continue. ' '71 The Fields court
concluded that the SEC and DOJ's parallel proceedings were a "commendable
example of inter-agency cooperation. 72
The principle established in Stringer and Scrushy would be difficult for
courts to apply because it hinges on a fact-based and ultimately subjective
determination as to whether DOJ and the SEC have cooperated too closely with
one another. The holdings also relied on fact-based inquiries to reach the
conclusion that DOJ had determined that it would prosecute before it informed
defendants of its intentions. If government agents and attorneys are not required
to record all communications with one another, then it would be extremely
difficult for a court to discern whether, on the whole, the two agencies had
coordinated too much or whether they were justified in failing to inform a
prospective defendant of likely prosecution.
CONCLUSION
As long as SEC officials remind witnesses of their right against compulsory
self-incrimination, courts should stand by the pre-Stringer/Scrushy case law.
The previously established standards for invalidating parallel proceedings-
failure to inform a witness of constitutional rights, false statement to a witness,
and civil discovery solely to benefit a criminal prosecution-sufficiently
protect defendants while promoting the public's interest in law enforcement.
70. As evinced by the recent formation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force, the President has
identified cooperation between DOJ and the SEC as an effective means of law enforcement. Exec. Order
No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003), reprinted as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. 112004) (establishing
the Corporate Fraud Task Force).
71. 592 F.2d at 646 n. 19 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 10 (1977)).
72. Id. at 646.

